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This article argues that cfuil society organisations (CSO, play an increasingly
prominent role in combating corruption in countries that have recently democratised.
Democracy cannot survive without accountability, but in transitional democracies the
formal accountability mechanisms associated with democratic governance are typically
inffictive. "Horizontal accountability" in the form of check-and-balance mechanisms
between various state institutions usually does not function well due to the poor capacity of
state institutions. "Vertical accountability" through general elections very often fails to
bring state actors to account. In such circumstances, we should not be surprised that
corruption becomes endemic. In order to reduce corruption, therefore, emerging
democracies need far-reaching political reforms to develop sound systems of accountability.
But because many state and business actors represent groups with a yested interest in
corrupt activities and which generally resist reform initiatives, this article proposes that
initiatives for such reform are best generated by organisations based on political
movements within the broader community, namely tivil society organisations'.
Keywords: Anti- corruption Measures, Civil So ciety Organisations, D emocratisation
in D eteloping Countries, Public Accountability
*This article draws primarily upon a Ph.D. dissertation recently completed by Setiyono (2011).
The empirical data on the Indonesian case are summarised in Setiyono and Mcleod (2010).
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Corruption has triggered the collapse of authoritarian regimes in a
number of developing countries, notably Iran in 1979,IJganda in 1979,
Thailand in 1982, Argentina in 1982, Haiti in 1985, the Philippines in 1986,
Brazil in 1986, Nigeria in 1998, and Indonesia in 1998. In all these cases,
regime change was followed by efforts to implement rapid democratisation,
during the course of which the failure to control corruption constituted
perhaps the most evident weakness of the newly democratic regimes; the very
phenomenon that helped precipitate regime change became a serious
challenge to the political legitimacy of the new regime. The structural reason
for this failure can be put quite simply: governmental institutions in a new
political order are almost inevitably weak. Overcoming this structural
weakness is a complex and difficult task, and such limitations on state
capacity make it crucial that civil society take an active political role. One
purpose of this article is to examine the role that civil society organisations
(CSOs) are required to play in combating corruption during the democratic
transition.
As described at greater length below recent studies have recognised the
importance of understanding the social context that makes corruption more
likely in a transitional democracy. Based on both the following literature
review and on our observations ofthe Indonesian experience, we suggest that
CSOs play an increasingly important role in policy formation and policy
implementation in new democracies for two reasons. Firstly, civil society
leaders had been generally key players in the struggle against corruption
under the authoritarian regime, and political activists generally expect them
to lead this struggle during democratic consolidation. Secondly, the failure of
the state to deal adequately with this problem creates a new political space,
one that is best filled by CSOs.
While it is important to establish the role of CSOs in the process of
democratic consolidation, it is more difficult to accurately describe how their
activities may or may not advance the anti-corruption drive. The theorisation
of CSO operations is often inadequate, and the second purpose of this article
is to propose a framework for describing how CSOs fight corruption. A later
section of this article describes the mechanisms by which CSOs would
contribute to anti-corruption efforts. We conclude by asking, what are the
implications for state-society relations when CSOs assume such a role during
periods of democratisation?
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Key Concepts: Corruption and Accountability
Before we begin our analysis, we need to first establish some conceptual
ground rules. Corruption is usually described as behaviour involving the
misuse of public office or resources for private interest (Rose-Ackerman
1978; Moodie 1980; Andvig and Moene 1990, p. 11; Huther and Shah 2000, p.
1). For this investigation we employ the tipology of corruption developed by
Shah and Schacter (2004), who suggest three broad categories: (a) 'grand
corruptioni' where a small number of officials steal or misuse considerable
stocks of public resources; (b) "state capture" or "regulatory capture,"
involving collusion between public and private agents for personal benefit;
and (c) "bureaucratic" or "petty" corruption, namely the involvement of
usually a large number of public officials in extorting small bribes or favours.
Grand corruption and state capture is usually committed by political elites or
senior government officials who design policies or legislation for their own
benefit, enabling them to misuse large amounts of public revenue and/or
facilities, often while taking bribes from national or transnational companies.
At the other end of this scale, petty corruption is committed by ordinary civil
servants when implementing government policy. It usually takes place at the
point of exchange between public and civil servants offering public services
such as in immigration, the police force, hospitals, taxation offices, schools,
or licensing authorities (Shah and Schacter 2004,p.41).
Regardless of its cause and form, corruption occurs whenever power
holders are not subject to close social monitoring. A useful measure for the
leve1 of corruption in a particular country is the formula proposed by
KJitgaard (1988, p. 75):
Corruption = Monopol/ + Discretion - Accountability
If an official controls access to a resource but possesses discretionary
power without significant social constraint, then s/he will have more
opportunity to act corruptly. By contrast, an effective accountability system
ensures good governance, for a high level of accountability obliges power
holders "to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of
behaviour"; importantly, "they will be sanctioned for failure to do so' (Grant
and Keohane 2005, p. 30).
Several forms of accountability need to be implemented simultaneously
in order to constrain corruption: "horizontal accountability" involving viable
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check-and-balance mechanisms between state institutions, "vertical
accountability" whereby officials are subject to elections and other forms of
social monitoring, and "external accountability" entailing robust international
scrutiny and support (Diamond 1999). The operation of such mechanisms
will reduce corruption because it will result in the punishment of government
officials who behave corruptly or are incapable of delivering good services to
their citizens (Fackler and Lin 1995; Bailey and Valenzuela 1997; Rose-
Ackerman 1999; Laffont and Meleu 2001). By contrast, corrupt activity-
whether it is "petty," "regulatory" or "grand" in scale-becomes more
widespread if accountability is not rigidly enforced.
Of direct relevance to this study, each of our three categories of
corruption is measured, each more prevalent in developing democracies than
in mature democratic countries. In order to assess the effectiveness of
measures to combat corruption during a period of democratisation, we
therefore need to explore various explanations for its prevalence in the
developing world.
Theorising Corruption and the Democratic Transition
We can identify a number of explanations commonly used to account
for the high incidence of corruption in developing countries. For some,
corruption is closely related to distribution of wealth: the greater the income
inequality, the higher the level ofcorruption. It is suggested that ifresources
and opportunities are equally distributed, people are more likely to share with
others and consider themselves part of the broad society. In a highly unequal
society, on the other hand, people tend to become more protective of their
own interests-and are more likely to indulge in corruption as a means to
that end. In this perspective, the level of corruption in developing countries is
the product of income inequality (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, p.52; Husted
1999,p.342;see also Scott 1972a).
Other theorists suggest that corruption occurs when the elite has more
opportunity to enrich itself. Countries that have legal and socio-economic
systems that maximise the risk of being caught and punished are likely to
have less corruption. But developing countries are often dominated politically
by elites who are above the law lessening the effectiveness of such "reward
and punishment" mechanisms (Treisman 2000, p. 400). Governance is
tlpically influenced by strongly clientelist or patrimonial cultures that have a
number of common characteristics: poor legal enforcement, high degree of
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state intervention in private activity, extensive public employment, poor
accountability mechanisms, and political authoritarianism (He1-wood 1997;
Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003; Szeftel 2000).
A third explanation for the higher levels of corruption in developing
countries emphasises the historical process of capital accumulation, suggesting
that corruption is a form of primitive accumulation by an emerging domestic
capitalist class. In developed countries the capitaiist class initially secured its
resources and wealth through colonialism (Hicks 2004, p.11). But as Iyayi
(1986, pp.28-29) points out, corruption is more prevalent in developing
nations because their political and business elites lack the opportunity for
capital accumulation through other means. In this perspective, the high
incidence of corruption reflects the fact that these countries are relative
latecomers to capitalist development.
To sum up the argument thus far, it is possible to identifii three common
accounts for why corruption tends to be higher in developing countries: as a
consequence of higher levels of economic inequality, as a reflection of the
patrimonial cultures sustained by dominant political elites, or as an expression
of the fact that a country is in the early stages of capitalist development.
Notwithstanding such differences in factors responsible for the "ills" of
corruption in developing countries, one element is often shared: the
democratisation of political life is commonly prescribed as the cure.
Democratisation is defined here as the replacement of an authoritarian
regime by a democratic government through the mechanism of free and fair
elections (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Gill2000, pp.8- 2).It is often
expected that improved governance will eliminate a range of poor practices
(Cunningham 2002; Doig 2000; fohnston 2000b). Especially important for
the success of such efforts is the role of the mass media, making politics more
accessible to the public and the abuse of power more difficult (see Randall
1993).In this perspective, a number of mechanisms would ensure the
creation of a more open society, providing less room for the manipulation of
office.l
This optimistic scenario has not, however, been a reality for most
countries of the developing world. Certainly, the most corrupt regimes are
also the most authoritarian. But most of the newly democratic states swept
along by the "Third Wave" of democratisation that began in the mid-1970s
I Such mechanisms Spically include: the existence of elected officials; secret ballots; free, fair, and
frequent elections; political and economic competition; universal suffrage and citizenship; freedom
of expression and participation; alternative sources of information; associational recognition; and
the liberalisation of markets. See for example Dahl (1998) and Held (1995).
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(Huntington 1991) indicate that they have made little improvement in handling
corruption. In fact, Transparency International's Corruption Perception
Index (CPI)'? indicates that the level of corruption in most newly democratic
countries is not much different than it had been during their authoritarian
period. In some cases the situation is even worse (Beichelt ZOO+; Fleischer
1997; Harriss-White and White 1996; Hope and Chikulo 2000; Nickson\996;
Seligson 2002).
if there is no necessary link between democratisation and the success of
anti-corruption efforts, does this then mean that the two processes are
unrelated? Clearly, authoritarian politicai contexts offer more opportunities
for corrupt behaviour. But under what conditions does democratisation
reduce corruption? And when does it simply consolidate old practices-or
perhaps lead to new forms of corruption?
Before turning to the mechanisms that may link democratisation to anti-
corruption measures, we should be aware of the obstacles to be faced.
Democratisation itself may create structural conditions that encourage
corruption. For Moran (2001, pp. 378-79), all transitions to democracy tend
to make corruption worse, whether it involves establishing a new nation-state
during the process of decolonisation or constructing a new political order
after the emergence from authoritarian rule. In their comparative study of
democratisation in various countries, Rose and Shin (2001) also show that a
legitimate democratic regime creates new opportunities for corruption.
Similarly, the World Bank (2000, p. xix) finds that democratic transitions in
Eastern Europe and in the former USSR created fertile environments for
corruption, for they involved "the simultaneous transition processes of
building new political and economic institutions in the midst of a massive
redistribution of state assets."
In addition to such institutional uncertainties, the socio-political instability
associated with the democratic transition creates fertile fields for corruption
(Rose Ackerman 2000; Campante, Chor, and Anh Do 2008). The new regime
confronts a range of institutional problems: lack of state legitimacy, inability
of public agencies to pay employees a living wage, lack of preparedness on the
'z The CPI refers to the perceptions of the degree of corruptlon according to business people and
country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) (TI 2010). In 2010 the
1eve1s of CPI in a number of newly democratic countries were: Albania (3.4), Argentina (2.9),
Bangladesh (2.4),Braz1l (3.7), Bolivia (2.8), Cambodia (2.1), Indonesia (2.8), iamaica (3.3), Lebanon
(2.5), Nicaragua (2.5), Phllippines (2.4), Poland (5.3), Romania (3.7), Serbia (3.5), Thailand (3.5),
Ukraine Q.{, and Uzbekistan (1.6). These levels were far below those of developed democracies,
such as Finland (9.2), New Zealand (9.3), Sweden (9.2), Denmark (9.3), Australia (8.7), Norway
(8.6), United Kingdom (7.6), and Canada (8.9).
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part of leaders for political competition, unequal distribution of power
resources, and societal fragmentation (lohnston 2000 a, pp. 2 -3, 2000b;
Beichelt 2004, p. 127). Governance is characterised by the absence of an
independent judiciary, excessive state regulations, over-centralised government,
top-down political parties, inadequate watchdog elements, ineffective law
enforcement, and a weak media (Moran 2001; World Bank 2004, 2005a, pp.
10-11; Gray and Kaufman 1998). In short, in emerging democracies the
institutions needed for good governance and the management of scarce
resources remain underdeveloped.
To return to the central theme of this article, there is a period of time in
most newly democratic states before there evolves an effective system of
accountability that brings power holders to account. Regime change is
generally not accompanied by a corresponding shift in the political culture
towards one more suitable to democratic values. The new policy makers are
generally inexperienced in formal governmental affairs, and legislative
supervision of the executive and service providers is still ineffective. In the
case of Argentina, for example, a lack of political experience left politicians
incapable of dealing with experienced senior bureaucrats who had customarily
exercised excessive discretionary power during the authoritarian period
(Eaton 2003). And in the new Indonesia, political uncertainty causes politicians
to focus on short-term rather than long-term issues, resulting in less attention
to monitoring the performance of the government agencies that could enhance
accountability (World Bank 2003c, pp. vii-viii).3 This is hardly surprising,
because political parties in newly democratic countries tend to be "power
hungry'' after a long period of being detached from genuine political processes;
parties that were previously not able to develop a strong presence within the
parliament now want to stay in ofiice, reducing the effectiveness of parliament
as an arena for social control ofpolitics.
Additionally, we should bear in mind that not all politicians in a new
democratic era are supportive of democratic principles. They may maintain a
"reformist facade," but many are self-serving and seek personal wealth
through illegitimate means. The old "informal" rules still apply because the
new formal rules have yet to take effect. In fact, once in power, many actually
work to preserve undemocratic practices. In Indonesia, for example, the
judiciary and police used to function as instruments of the corrupt regime
3 When dealing with government agencies, for example, politicians in democratic transition
countries do not have sound recordkeeping and documentation practices, and tend to pursue illicit
deals rather than undertaking proper monitoring for the purpose of accountability (World Bank
2003c, p. viii; Reinikka and Svensson 2002).
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rather than of law enforcement; the disappearance of authoritarian figures
may have provided corrupt officials with even more freedom to pursue rent-
seeking opportunities (Lindsey 2002, pp. 2-12).
These conditions are usually aggravated by the fact that citizens in
developing democracies have limited capacity to monitor state authority;
political inexperience renders them less able to monitor the performance of
politicians. Although voter enthusiasm in elections was high in the newly
democratic Indonesia, most voters remained unaware of how elections could
promote ofticial accountability (Soule 2004, p. 2). Due to a lack of information
about both the new political system and the track record ofpoliticians, yoters
had insufficient knowledge when voting (Soule 2004, pp.2-3). Such lack of
social control is exacerbated by the tendency for politicians to rely on using
money and "clientelist impulses"a to attract voters (Keefer 2002, p.26).
Moreover, political parties often prefer a proportional representation system,
making individual politicians reliant on party Ieaders rather than their
constituents for both political survival and success (Sidel 1996; Carothers
2002,pp.9-14). As a result, elections and other forms of political competition
do not function as a means for social control of political life.s
Further, citizens are generally unable to effectively monitor the various
functions of the bureaucracy for some time following the change of regime;
they are still learning how to voice their demands. For its part, the bureaucracy
is still subject to an authoritarian culture in which it functioned as the
protector of the political class rather than an impartial public service provider.
In Indonesia, despite the public's growing awareness of its rights, the price of
collective action is typically high; rather than struggling for their rights,
people may find paying bribes more convenient and often cheaper (World
Bank 2003c, p. viii).
In a context in which reformist organisations, the market sector, and the
media are generally weak, attempts to constrain the government are very
difficult, and sometimes impossible. These conditions enable monopoly
systems to develop; corruption within governmental structures becomes
a A classical definition of this socio-political form is the patron-client relationship "in which an
individual ofhigher socloeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide
protection or benefits, or both, for a person oflower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by
offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron'(Scott 1972, p.
e2).
s For further examination of the dyramics of political competition and the relationship behveen
voters and politicians in a number of countrles undergoing a democratic transition, see Moran
(1999,2001), Rose and Shin (2001), Foweraker and Krznaric (2002), Keefer (2002), Soule (2004),
Khan (2005, pp.717 -2t), and Webber (2006).
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institutionalised. Frequently, these deficiencies are maintained by a handful
ofprivate interest groups that extort private "rents" from public resources, as
well as influencing state policies and regulations. Together with powerful
decision-makers, these groups develop a "vested interest" in corruption
(Kaufmann 2003, p.21; Johnston 2000b, p. 10). Powerful political-economic
structures emerge, characterised by a close interconnectedness between
privileged parts of the business sector and the government. In such
circumstances, corruption is not merely a problem for the government, but
also for the economy itself.
Taking these structures into account, overcoming corruption in
democratising developing countries thus represents a complex and
multidimensional challenge. Although the end of an authoritarian regime is a
necessary and important step, it is not the panacea that many expected.
Democratisation needs to be accompanied by a number of initiatives to make
government more efFective. In mature democracies, the development of the
basic institutions of a state governed by principles such as the rule of law and
government accountability took place over a very long period. In the West,
broad public participation associated with this process took hundreds of
years to develop, and was shaped by historical events such as the signing of
the Magna Carta in England in l2I5 and the political revolution in France
(1789-\799). Do then the emerging democracies of today also need to follow
the long historical trajectory mapped out by Europe?
Essentially, new democracies need to develop the basic institutions of a
modern state, one that is governed by the rule of law and accountability
(fohnston and Kpundeh 2004, p. 5). Crucially, reformers in developing
countries need to establish the political primacy of these principles more
quickly than was the case in the West, for the political pressures associated
with globalisation demand that goyernance issues are resolved. Increasingly,
we find that CSOs are thrust forward to take up this historical role.
To this effect, reform initiatives are generated by credible actors who can
persuade both the elites and ordinary voters that reform is important and in
their interest to support. As widely acknowledged, civil society leaders were
crucial in toppling authoritarian regimes and pushing for democratisation
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992;
Diamond 1994, p.5; Haynes 1997).6 In the post-authoritarian developing
6 Civil society actors played a significant role in fostering the end of authoritarian regimes in
Eastern Europe (Bernhard 1993; Miller 1992),in Indonesia (Nyman 2006), and in the Philippines
(Wurfel 1988).
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countries where the state is weak or unable to play its part in combating
corruption-or when government and business actors are generally apathetic
to the reform agenda-CSOs have taken the leading role in establishing the
rule of law. And because ordinary citizens in developing democracies usually
have little capacity to take significant action, CSOs serve to bridge this gap.
They commonly mediate between those who govern and those who are
governed, enhancing responsibility as well as responsiveness on both sides
(World Bank 2000, pp.44-45; Cornwall and Gaventa 2001).
At this point it must be acknowledged that CSOs face a number of
internal structural obstacles to becoming effective agents of social change.
They are generally financially insecure, face difficulties in attracting skilled
personnel, and often have highly personalised and inefficient management
structures. CSOs are also prone to becoming instruments for particular
political elites (Hedman 2001). \t\4rile it is beyond the scope of this article to
describe in detail the reorganisation often required for CSOs to function
effectively,T it has been found that their capacity to build coalitions with other
societal agencies serves to overcome such internal financial and management
constraints (McClusky 2002).
In fact, this capacity to build linkages gives CSOs a distinctive
characteristic, enhancing their effectiveness in fighting corruption. Political
parties may not want to initiate an anti-corruption reform agenda, for they
tend to represent particular interests that seek to gain access to institutional
power. By contrast, CSOs generally have little interest in winning formal
political power. Accordingly, CSOs are more likely to express a genuine
concern for the public interest (Pietrzyk 2003,p.42).In such circumstance,
CSOs can serve as independent bodies to apply pressure for the activation of
accountability mechanisms within the structures of political power. And, by
persistently combating corruption, they can stimulate a successful process of
democratisation and the formation of good governance.s
7 This issue is discussed in depth in Chapter 6 of Setiyono's 201 I thesis, "Organisational
Challenges for the Anti-Corruption CSOs: Resources, Integrity and Public Support." See also
Chapman and Fisher (2000), and jenkins and Goetz (1999).
8 While the term "governancd'has multiple interpretations, it is generally understood to represent
a decreasing role for government in organising state authority. More importantly, governance is not
only about the institutions or actors; it is also about quality and values. "Good governance" usually
connotes principles such as active public participation, transparency and accountability,
effectiveness and equitability, and the rule of1aw. These principles ensure that political, social, and
economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society, and that the voices of all the people are
heard when decisions are made about the allocatlon ofdevelopment resources (Abdeliatif2003, pp.
3-4).
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The Importance of Deveioping a Culture of Accountability
Successful efforts to combat corruption require more than establishing
powerful political institutions. Perhaps the most important constraint on
misuse of power is the general socio-political climate in which an official
operates. As the World Bank notes, the major element that allows corruption
to flourish in many countries is a "lack of transparency and accountability
based on the rule of law and democratic values on the part of public officialsl'
which leads to a 'distortion in policy priorities" (World Bank 2005, p.22).
Accordingly, in order to prevent corruption, it is necessary to develop both
effective accountability mechanisms and a political tradition of public
accountability.
Accountability obliges both officials and social figures to act morally. In
a democratic environment, accountability is the most important instrument
for the on-going correction of mistakes so as to preserve mechanisms that
ensure protection of the rights and interests of the people. Accountability
works to uphold the "social contract" between citizens and government
Bureaucracy / Appointed
officials (civil service, armed
forces, police seruices)
I rnlomal mon[onng : ....'.................'.'.'>
Frc. l.-The chain of accountability in a democratic setting (Beetham and Boyle
199s,p.67).
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(Blanchard, Hinnant, and Wong 1998). Government has to be responsible to
the people for its actions and faults; if a government performs well, public
support will continue, but if a government makes mistakes, citizens will
demand explanations, reparations, resignations from office of the persons
responsible, or even that the government takes steps to "shut down the agency
in question' (Scholte 2004, p. 2ll).
How then might such an accountability mechanism become an integral
part of the political system? As illustrated in figure 1, an effective chain of
accountability comprises a number of key formal relationships: between
citizens and their representatives in the political legislature; between the
legislature and the executive (head of government and cabinet ministers);
between the ministers and the bureaucracy as the front-line service providers;
and, finally, between the service providers and citizens. In this sense, a
functioning accountability mechanism serYes as a map of the governmental
processes in a democracy, one in which unpopular actions on the part of
public officials may result in new sanctions brought by citizens (Philp 2001,
p.361).
This framework can help us better detect failures that contribute to
corruption at different levels of the accountability chain. The theory of PAC
(principle-agent-client) provides a useful means to apply this framework.
This theory is a market-based concept that describes the mechanisms
involved in the interactions between a buyer (the principal) and a seller (the
agent).e According to this theory, corruption usually arises when two factors
are present: a "divergence of incentives" (the interests of the principal and
agent diverge) and an "asymmetry of information" (the principal has
insufficient information about the performance of the agent). Agents thus
have an incentive to hide information (Klitgaard 1988, p. 75).10 Agents may
behave corruptly if they believe that the benefits would exceed the risk of
discovery and associated legal, psychological, and social damage. On the
other hand, corruption will be discouraged if this calculation is unlikely:
Every link in the chain of accountability functions properly such that
monitoring by the principal works against the possibility that the agent might
consider that the benefits exceed the risk.
As outlined in figure 1, the chain of formal accountability begins with
link 1, namely between citizens and politicians; the monitoring mechanism is
e PAC theorists generally deny moral issues, focusing instead on the rational choice of individuals
to undertake corrupt transactions (Rose-Ackerman 1978).
10 In this case, principals are those who give their authority to other parties to act on their behalf;
agents are those who are obliged to execute that actlon.
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carried out through free and fair elections. In this link, people select politicians
who they believe are capable of realising their aspirations. In addition to
facilitating leadership succession, elections function implicitly as a mechanism
of "contingent renewal," whereby the people decide to either extend or
terminate the tenure of a government (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999,
p. 10).This ensures that elected politicians and ministers oblige their
ministries and service providers to serve the interests of the people. The
uninhibited flow of information is necessary for this link to function as an
effective accountability mechanism; elections need a degree of "merit
competition," one that enables the citizens to judiciously evaluate the
performance of contestants in both a retrospective and a prospective manner
(Adsera et aL.2003, pp. aa7-a8). Making such a judgment requires, in turn, a
transparent political system that allows exchange of information about what
should be andwhat actually is happening in the political arena.
In the next link in the chain, namely link 2, the legislature monitors the
performance of the executive by various means, including budget allocations,
financial and performance reports, and through third-party institutions such
as supervisory bodies (anti-corruption commissions and ombudsmen) and
external auditors (auditor-general). Legislatures may still encounter two
possible handicaps in using these instruments: hidden information, where
politicians do not know fully the competencies or preferences of their agents,
or what is required to adequately address the task at hand; and hidden action,
when politicians cannot fully observe the actions of their agents. Such a
condition could give rise to an agency problem, namely a situation in which
the agent acts in ways that are contrary to the interest of the legislature
(Strom 2000, p. 270).Even though they may have the technical support of
assistants, politicians must also possess sufficient political skills-both
knowledge and experience-to deal effectively with their agents. In order to
monitor the work of the implementing agencies carrying out public health
insurance programs, for example, the legislature needs to be knowledgeable
about public health insurance issues for this monitoring to be effective.
In the next formal link in the chain of accountability, namely link 3, the
executive (especially the ministers) monitors the bureaucracy or service
providers by means of legal frameworks, internal auditors, and systems that
ensure ethical conduct such as reward-punishment systems (by means of
salaries, incentives, administrative sanctions, legal actions, etc.). A recent
notion of public organisational configuration and management called New
Public Management (NPM) proposes that bureaucracies follow the forms of
accountability developed for private organisations (Parker and Gould 1999).
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This link in the chain of accountability requires the bureaucracy to adhere to
a number of organisati.onal principles, including sound policy management
and implementation; performance evaluation and explicit targets for
efficiency, effectiveness, and quality; output and outcome targets; strategic
corporate plans; and quantified benchmarking of performance targets. This
recipe transforms bureaucrats from administrators and custodians of
resources into managers emPowered with gteater delegated authority, but
with an orientation towards achieving specified results (Parker and Gould
1999, p. 111).
Formal accountability mechanisms may be further strengthened by the
existence of non-governmental state institutions such as Auditors-General,
Anti-Corruption Commissions, Ombudsmen and, most importantly, an
independent judiciary (link a). These institutions are given the task of
ensuring that all public agencies work in accordance with the rule of law.
Such institutions function as instruments for "horizontal accountability";
they may call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of
discharging the responsibilities of a given office (O'Donnell 1999'p.165).
Such formal mechanisms of accountability do not automatically curb
corruption, however. To function effectively, these mechanisms need to be
supported by a number of general political pre-conditions: a significant
degree of political competition, competent actors in every link of the chain,
the existence of clear regulations that make clear both of the reward-
punishment and check-and-balance mechanisms, free access to information'
and a high degree of transparency in the governmental and political systems
(Lederman et al. 2005, p. 4; Quirk 1997; Strom 1997).In other words, the
success of such formal accountability mechanisms depends on the broad
social and cultural climate in which they are applied.
Most importantly, only the close monitoring of governmental institutions
by the citizenry will ensure that they function effectively. Citizens need to
voice their appreciation, concern, or dissatisfaction with the quality of the
institutions' performance. When such monitoring is strong, the poor
performance of public officials or institutions will be brought under public
scrutiny, making them less likely to ignore or abuse their obligations in the
future. Furthermore, citizens need to be able to attain necessary information,
analyse situations, and organise political activities in order to understand
how public agencies function as a means of undertaking such monitoring.
Hence, because individual action is usually not effective, citizens need to
develop community-based activities grounded on a set of common interests.
As illustrated in figure 1, CSOs can facilitate such activities, acting as
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advocates for citizens and holding individual government officials to account.
In other words, in order for policy reforms to be implemented effectively,
CSOs must become the source of pro-accountability measures, by "askingi'
"accelerating," and "empowering" state actors to deliver the expected
outcomes (Schedler 1999, p. 338).
Civil Society, Democracy, and Policy Implementation
CSOs thus have the potential to significantly contribute to corruption
eradication efforts. As illustrated in figure 1, shortcomings in the formal
accountability system require CSOs to take a more prominent role in
developing countries. They can contribute by generating more effective
relations between the state and its citizens, thereby enhancing the vertical
dimension of accountability. They can raise the expectations of the public
about the performance of state officials, and thus, apply pressure on the state
to comply with citizens' demands. CSOs can also activate effective checks and
balances between state institutions by initiating institutional oversight
frameworks that reveal abuses of power, while pressing legal agencies to act
against the abusers. They can thereby also enhance the horizontal dimension
of accountability. These activities often correct erroneous decisions and help
eradicate systemic corruption or other distortions of accountability (Fox
2000, p. 1).
More specifically, and as detailed in table 1, CSOs operate at two levels in
reforming accountability and anti-corruption protocols. At the strategic level,
CSOs endorse policy reform for strengthening the check-and-balance
mechanisms between state institutions. They play this role by helping to
formulate anti-corruption policies and taking the lead in the effort to build
strong legal and institutional frameworks.
Such actMty at this strategic level might not have an immediate impact,
but is very significant indirectly. In order to bear fruit, it is important that
efforts to combat corruption are carried out in a context of strong laws and
regulations, without which they would be ineffective-if not counterproductive.
CSOs should thus analyse the causes of corruption in a particular setting, and
offer solutions to policy makers. And CSOs can encourage politicians and
policy makers to draft the anti-corruption regulations that can stimulate the
functioning of effective accountability mechanisms. CSOs also need to
promote the formation of state agencies specifically assigned to eradicate
corruption. Their role in strengthening the capacity of such agencies is
Raronus
Nou.-compiled by Setiyono (2011), adapted from Kpundeh (2005)
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Initiating codes of conduct for public officials and declaration
of assets; initiating draft on anti-corruption regulations;
pushing for decentralisation and deregulation; demanding the
establishment of anti-corruption bodies; carrying out surveys
on corruption; conducting public hearings and referenda on
drafts, decrees, regulations, and laws; ensuring freedom of the
press by prohibiting censorship and encouraging diversity of
media ownership; promoting high-quality political
competition through free and fair election; public education.
Educating citizens concerning corruption and state affairs;
encouraging continuous popular participation; facilitating
dialogue between people and the state; informing citizens
about the state and government's performance and behaviour;
supporting law enforcement and punishment of deceptive
state actors; undertaking corruption inquiries; elevating
standards and public expectations of state performance;
monitoring the performance of law enforcement agencies
(police, auditors, ombudsman, judges, attorneys, public
prosecutors); publishing investigative reports; organising class
actions; protecting whistleblowers; ensuring public access to
government information; requiring transparency in
government; monitoring government performance in areas
such as large-scale public procurement bidding; using new
web-based tools on the internet for transparency, disclosure,
public participation, and dissemination of information;
piloting anti-corruption programs.
crucial because the performance of formal judicial institutions in developing
democracies is usually poor; they often act to protect corrupt groups, as we
have seen.
New legal and institutional frameworks will thus only succeed if citizens
organise themselves effectively to oversee the implementation of anti-
corruption regulations. These "strategic level" actiYities thus have to be taken
in conjunction with those at a practical level, whereby the community is
organised to monitor state institutions and demand that policy reforms be
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realised. At this level, CSOs mobilise citizens to actively monitor the behaviour
and performance of state institutions, as well as the work of anti-corruption
agencies. CSOs themselves can thus function as agencies to independently
monitor government activities. As suggested by Fox (2000), CSOs can impose
accountability on the state by detecting and exposing abuse of power, by
elevating standards and, thus, the public's expectations of state performance,
and by exerting political pressure. This important "watchdog role" of CSOs
has decreased the occurrence of corruption in a number of countries. As
various studies have found, CSOs around the world have successfully
combated corruption, not only detecting and revealing particular cases, but
also bringing corrupt figures to justice (TI 1997,1998; Gonzalez de Asis 2000;
Pope 2000).
In the performance of such practical activities, CSOs need not be
detached from governmental processes. In fact, and as illustrated in table 1,
they also maintain a wide range of dynamic relationships that serve to
interconnect government and citizen. For example, in his evaluation of the
World Bank's multilateral development bank (MDB) projects, Fox (1997)
finds that CSOs in several countries were able to increase their effectiveness
by not only monitoring and supervising aid flows, but also helping in their
execution. Similarly, social monitoring and facilitation stimulated by CSOs
has proved vital in ensuring the clean implementation in several countries of
another World Bank project, the "Poverty Reduction Strategy" (PRS) (Barbone
and Sharkey 2006).
Despite the significant social benefits that are derived, such endeavours
are often resisted by social elites and their patrons. CSOs thus need to be able
to fight off pressures from vested interest groups in a professional and well-
informed manner. Importantly, CSOs cannot work alone in this endeavour;
they need to build a broad coalition to have significant impact. For this
reason CSOs have made long-term efforts to encourage all stakeholders to act
collectively.ll Groups within the media, academia, and the business sector
have been involved in such coalitions. Ultimately, this may in turn encourage
politicians to support anti-corruption reforms because they will also benefit
from improvements in popularity, international image, legitimacy, and the
likelihood of their own political survival (johnston and Kpundeh 2005, pp.
162-63).
1r This idea has been recognised in international anti-corruption forums. The United Nations, for
example, has adopted the term "interagency coordination'to strengthen horizontal and vertical
coordination, as (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010,p.29). "International Group for
Anti-corruption Coordination'(IGAC) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010, p. 29).
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It is certainly undeniable that CSOs in developing countries will encounter
difficulties in forming such a political constituency simply because anti-
corruption efforts generate risks for state officials. Civil servants often find
anti-corruption campaigns threatening: Honest officials may fear being
mocked when they cooperate with CSOs, while dishonest officials will raise
obstacles to efforts to expose and punish their illicit activities (Klitgaard 1991,
p.97). And there are always fewer groups that have a stake in anti-corruption
measures than, for example, lobbies for promoting soy production or new
education facilities. Although it is possible to launch a wide-ranging anti-
corruption campaign while there is a wave of public resentment against the
former authoritarian regime, institutionalising and sustaining such public
concern is not always easy. Against such a socio-political backdrop, the success
of CSOs in combating corruption during the turmoil unleashed by a democratic
transition will be determined by both their internal organisational capacity and
their ability to develop strong networks with emergent political forces.
Concluding Comments
The need for CSOs to build strong networks with various social forces
during a democratic transition brings us back to the issue implied in the title
of this article: What is the nature of the relationship between civil society,
anti-corruption measures, and the success or failure of the democratic
transition? More specifically, what should be the role of CSOs in establishing
respect for the rule of law? Can their activities help build trust in the
institutions of the state? Or is the success of anti-corruption efforts
contingent upon prior consolidation of democracy?
Clearly, democratisation alone is not a sufficient remedy for corruption.
In fact, democratization usually creates political instability, making law
enforcement and accountability mechanisms more difficult. Also, governments
in transition are generally inexperienced in the implementation of measures
to combat corruption. Because of this lack of state capacity, civil society
actors bear more responsibility for strengthening accountability mechanisms.
Rather than ineffective politicians, bureaucrats, or business groups, CSOs
must shoulder the responsibility for realising this vital element of the
democratic consolidation. A schematic representation of the critical role of
CSOs in dealing with corruption in transitional democracies is suggested in
figure 2.
The initial political "opening" that usually precedes a democratic
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FIc. 2.-A theoretical framework for the rise of CSOs in combating corruption
during democratic transition
transition does serve to empower anti-corruption CSOs. The lifting of
restrictions on civil rights following the fall of an authoritarian regime
enables CSOs to coordinate collective action to monitor the behaviour and
performance of political and bureaucratic agencies, as conceptualized in PAC
theory. CSOs may thus act as representatives of the public, allowing the
principal to hold its agents to account.
The enhanced role of CSOs in a number of developing countries
suggests that democratisation presents the CSOs with a greater degree of
political influence. As is also illustrated in figure 2, the role of CSOs in
dealing with corruption is not limited to serving as watchdogs that expose
misappropriations in the state sector: They also have an interest in ensuring
that every link in the accountability chain within the government system
operates smoothly. In other words, CSOs can not only increase the risks
associated with corruption by conducting external monitoring and bringing
corrupt figures to justice, they can also reduce the likelihood ofcorruption by
initiating policy reforms and ensuring their implementation.
We might think of this latter function as comprising two "feedback
loops," whereby CSOs' strategic role in advocating policy change and their
instrumental role in monitoring policy implementation reinforces the
democratic transition itself. The extent to which CSOs become influential
actors in a new democracy will thus depend on the extent to which they are
able to increase their operational efficiency and strengthen their links to
other social forces. Ifthey are able to undertake these tasks successfully, they
can thereby make a significant contribution to processes of social change in
emerging democracies.
The rise of CSOS
that llght against
corupljon
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